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The EU and Climate Change Policy: 
Law, Politics and Prominence at 
Different Levels 
 
Chad Damro, Iain Hardie & Donald MacKenzie 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The European Union (EU) is a prominent player in the politics of climate change, operating as an 
authoritative regional actor that influences policy-making at the national and international levels. The 
EU’s climate change policies are thus subjected to multiple pressures that arise from the domestic 
politics of its twenty-seven individual member states and the international politics of non-EU states 
with which it negotiates. Facing these multiple pressures, how and why could such a non-traditional 
actor develop into a prominent player at different levels of climate change policy-making? This article 
argues that the EU’s rise to prominence can be understood by tracking a number of historical-legal 
institutional developments at the domestic and international levels. The article also provides a 
preliminary investigation of the EU emissions trading scheme, a new institutional mechanism that 
illustrates the policy pressures arising from different levels. 
 
 
 
WHILE THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) IS A PROMINENT PLAYER IN THE POLITICS OF 
climate change, it is neither a state nor an international organisation in the traditional 
sense.1 Rather, it operates as a proactive and authoritative regional actor that can 
influence policy-making in significant ways at the national and international levels. The 
EU’s legal and political capacity to promulgate domestic climate change legislation and 
to play a significant role in international environmental politics arises from the fact that 
its twenty-seven member states have pooled sovereignty in environmental policy-
making. Its unique nature and position also means that EU policy-making is subject to 
multiple pressures from both the national and international levels, a situation that 
potentially complicates social scientific efforts to explain the causes of initiatives and 
outcomes in EU climate change policy. 
 
Despite its complex, internal institutional design, the EU’s impact is directly apparent at 
the national and regional levels. The EU has and continues to play a significant role in 
designing European climate change legislation as well as encouraging and interacting 
with national climate change activity within its Member States. Its European Climate 
Change Programme (ECCP) in 2000, began a process of screening measures in the 
fields of energy, transport and industry. According to the European Commission, since 
the launch of the ECCP, the EU has put in place more than thirty initiatives to counter 
climate change (2006: 1). Table 1 lists the key initiatives that have resulted from this 
programme. 
                                                 
1 For simplicity, this study refers to the “EU” when discussing the Union’s climate change policies. The 
term “EC” will be used in this article only when necessary for legal clarity and when citing secondary 
sources. 
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Table 1: The European Climate Change Programme—Key Measures as of 20062 
 
Measure 
Reduction 
potential (Mt Co2-
eq.) 
EU-15, 2010 
Entry into Force 
Starting to 
Deliver 
EU emission trading 
scheme 
- 2003 2005 
Link JI/CDM to 
emission trading 
- 2004 2005/2008 
Directive on 
promotion of 
electricity from 
renewable energy 
sources 
100-125 2001 2003 
Directive on 
promotion of CHP 
65 2004 2006 
Directive on energy 
performance of 
buildings 
35-45 2003 2006 
Directive on 
promotion of 
transport biofuels 
35-40 2003 2005 
Landfill directive 40 1999 2000 
ACEA/JAMA/KAMA 
voluntary 
commitment 
75-80 1998 1999 
Energy labelling 
directives 
20 1992 1993 
Biomass action plan - 2005 2006 
 
Source: Jos Delbeke (2006: 6). 
 
At the international level, the EU has been a prominent player in climate change 
politics via the process initiated by the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC).3 The UNFCCC provided a non-binding framework for 
further international negotiations on climate change and provided a venue in which 
the EU could actively participate despite its non-traditional nature. The subsequent 
negotiations occurred as the regular, so-called Conferences of the Parties (COPs). 
Following the 1997 COP-3 that resulted in the signing of the Kyoto Protocol, the EU 
played a prominent role as an advocate for the ratification of the agreement.4 The EU 
was rewarded for its efforts in 2005 when enough countries ratified the Protocol for it 
to enter into force. Although its position has shifted and activity has fluctuated during 
these lengthy negotiations, the Union is now often described as a ‘leader’ or 
                                                 
 
2 Delbeke also notes important, climate change related developments in voluntary commitments 
from auto manufacturers to improve CO2 efficiency, an energy labelling system for consumers, 
methane reduction initiatives for landfills, fluorinated gas substitution regulation, work on energy 
services and energy using products, and consumer incentives for CO2 friendly automobiles (2006: 5-7). 
For more on the EU’s climate change policies, see http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/s15012.htm. 
Oberthür and Tänzler (2007: 255) also list many EU climate change policies and individual, national 
policies by Member States. 
3 The UNFCCC was agreed at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de 
Janeiro and entered into force in March 1994. 
4 At COP-7, held in Marrakech, Morocco, from 29 October to 9 November 2001, the Parties adopted the 
Marrakech Accords, a comprehensive set of detailed rules for implementing the Protocol. The EU and its 
Member States ratified the Marrakech Agreement in 2002. 
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‘frontrunner’ in international environmental politics.5 While the academic debates over 
‘leadership’ are outside the analytical focus of this article, the EU does operate as a 
prominent actor in the ongoing negotiations over the types of arrangements that will 
follow the expiration of Kyoto in 2012. As a party to the Kyoto Protocol, the EU has 
participated prominently in important and intensive interactions with non-members 
and international organisations. According to Oberthür, “the commitments entered 
into under the climate change regime have affected the rules of other international 
institutions and EU legal instruments” (2006: 56-58), resulting in various types of 
institutional interaction across different levels. More generally, the EU remains an active 
and prominent protagonist for changes in global environmental governance, especially 
through the United Nations and its associated bodies (Vogler 2005). 
 
Given its domestic and international activity, the EU provides an interesting case in 
which multiple causes interact across national, regional and international levels of 
analysis. This climate change activity at different levels begs the following question: 
How and why has a non-traditional, regional actor such as the EU become a prominent 
player in climate change politics at both the national and international levels? This 
question is particularly intriguing considering that, at its origins in 1957, the Union had 
no authority over domestic environmental policy generally, much less specific 
authority to engage in international climate change negotiations. 
 
It is worth emphasising at the outset that this article does not intend to test the 
comparative influence of multiple pressures from different levels. Rather, the article 
asserts that the conditions for the EU’s rise to prominence in this policy area can be 
understood by tracking a number of historical-legal institutional developments that 
have occurred at the domestic and international levels. While these changes have 
created opportunities for the EU to engage in multilateral climate change politics, the 
shifting authority from the Member States to the EU institutions has also increased 
internal policy-making complexity. The following study of the institutional 
developments should provide a basis for further analyses of EU climate change policy 
that incorporate more systematically the role of various actors at different levels.6 
 
The article proceeds in the following manner. The next section describes the historical 
and legal establishment of the EU’s authority to engage in environmental policy-
making within the Union. The third section explores the ways in which the EU acquired 
its ability to engage in international environmental politics. The fourth section 
investigates the EU’s emissions trading scheme, a climate change mechanism that 
illustrates the institutional complexity of the Union as well as the political interaction 
that occurs between domestic and international levels. The final section provides a 
summary of the findings and suggests different directions for further research that may 
help to illuminate the politics of EU climate change policies and policy-making. 
 
 
Internal Institutional Developments and EU Environmental Policy-Making 
 
Environmental policy, much less the specifics of climate change, did not appear in the 
original 1957 Treaty of Rome that established the European Economic Community.7 
While this might seem a surprising oversight today, it is understandable in historical 
terms. In the 1950s, environmental policy was not a highly salient political issue for an 
organisation that was focusing on economic efforts to help recover from the 
                                                 
5 For work on the EU as a ‘leader’ in international environmental politics, see Schreurs and Tiberghien 
(2007), Damro (2006), Skodvin and Andresen (2006), Wettestad (2005), Zito (2005), Vig and Faure 
(2004), Christiansen and Wettestad (2003), Hovi et al. (2003), Andresen and Agrawala (2002), Gupta and 
Ringius (2001), Gupta and Grubb (2000). 
6 See, for example, efforts investigating the subnational/national level in individual EU Member States 
(Harris 2007, Compston and Bailey 2008, Fisher 2004, Vig and Faure 2004) and their interaction at the 
EU level (Damro and MacKenzie 2008, Delreux 2006, Janning 2005, Barket et al. 2001). 
7 For a useful history and introduction to EU environmental policy, see Lenschow (2005). 
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devastating effects of war. These early regional efforts targeted economic integration, 
not environmental protection. But how could the EU have developed such a 
formidable role in environmental policy today given these humble origins? A number 
of internal developments, which will be identified below in chronological order, helped 
to establish the EU’s influence in environmental policy and contributed to its ability to 
engage in international climate change negotiations. 
 
The first major development was a legal decision by the European Court of Justice. The 
1971 ERTA Decision was not an environment-specific ruling; it addressed cross-border 
transportation policy issues within the Union.8 Nevertheless, the language in the ruling 
provided an opening for the Commission to argue for external competence in 
environmental policy and extended the EU’s “external competence in one vast stroke” 
across multiple policy areas (Macrory and Hession 1996: 123). According to the 
decision, when the European Community has the right (that is, acquires legal 
competence) to legislate internally, it also has the right to act externally in matters that 
might affect that internal legislation. As a result, the EU typically “first legislates and 
then exercises external jurisdiction. The Court’s case law did not, however, clarify 
whether the Commission or the Council Presidency would represent the Community in 
international fora…Furthermore, the Court’s decision did not change the international 
status of the Community’s member-states” (Sbragia 1998a: 287-88). 
 
Not long after the ERTA decision, the EU issued its first Environmental Action 
Programme (EAP). These non-binding EAPs set out the framework and strategies and 
priorities for EU environmental policy-making. The first was issued in 1973. During the 
early 1970s, the Commission began including environmental cooperation with third 
parties in its EAPs. The Commission linked competence over environmental policy with 
its competence in trade policy by arguing that implementation of international 
environmental agreements could affect EU competitiveness. Consequently, during the 
1970s, the EU became party to a number of multilateral environmental agreements. 
The 5th EAP (1993) included climate change as a ‘theme’. The most recent 6th EAP (a 
decision of the European Parliament and Council) runs from 2002-2012, and includes 
four priority areas: climate change, nature and biodiversity, environment and health, 
and natural resources and waste. The EU’s environmental policy generally conforms to 
its EAPs, which helps to give it internal coherence and consistency. 
 
In 1981, the Commission established the Directorate-General XI, which would become 
the DG Environment of today. It represents a serious effort at institutionalising 
environmental policy and reflects “an institutional acknowledgment of the growing 
importance of environmental protection within the Community’s policy portfolio. It has 
also provided the main channel for environmental groups trying to pressure the 
Commission toward ‘greener’ proposals, with the result that it has often been treated 
with suspicion by those within the Commission concerned with economic 
development and market liberalization” (Sbragia 1998b: 170). DG Environment now 
provides a home for the coordination of EU environmental policy, including the Union’s 
international relations. 
 
The first inclusion of environmental policy in the primary legislation of the EU came 
with the 1986 Single European Act (SEA). The SEA incorporated environmental policy 
into the EU’s treaty structure, giving it an explicit legal basis from which to make policy. 
Before the SEA, “the Commission primarily based [environmental] legislation under 
Treaty Article 100 (harmonizing national regulations that inhibit common market trade) 
or Article 235 (permitting the pursuit of Community objectives in the course of 
operating the common market where the Treaty has not provided the necessary 
powers). Accordingly, an important rationale for Community environmental activity 
was protecting the common market from national environmental legislation that acts 
as trade (non-tariff) barriers” (Zito 2005: 367). The SEA also gave the EU a legal basis for 
                                                 
8 Case 22/70 Re the European Road Transport Agreement: EC Commission v. EC Council 1971 ELR 60-79. 
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negotiating international environmental agreements in Article 130r (5), which states 
that “within their respective spheres of competence, the Community and the Member 
States shall cooperate with third countries and with the relevant international 
organizations” (Sbragia 1998a: 289). 
 
In 1990, the EU took another internal institutional stride when the Council approved 
the creation of the European Environment Agency (EEA). The key role of the EEA is that 
of information provider and analyst. While it is not directly involved in international 
decision-making, it does interact with international partners, including European 
Economic Area member countries (Iceland, Norway, Leichtenstein), accession countries, 
international organisations (e.g., UNEP, WHO, OECD), and the Balkan countries.9 Much 
of the public information the EEA provides covers developments in the science and 
policy of climate change at both national and international levels. 
 
In 1992, the EU experienced another significant internal development with implications 
for climate change and international negotiations. The Maastricht Treaty granted the 
EU competence to conclude international environmental agreements, which then are 
binding on the Union’s institutions and its Member States. The Treaty also “included a 
new objective for Community action: Community policy on the environment should 
contribute to ‘promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or 
worldwide environmental problems’” (Sbragia 1998a: 290). 
 
These internal developments helped to establish environmental policy within the EU 
and increased the authority of the supranational European Commission. As Zito argues, 
“The EU’s ability to act in its own right as an environmental actor is a by-product of the 
historical evolution of complex institutional forces. Just as the EU was expanding its 
environmental policy scope, it was also enhancing enormously its international profile” 
(2005: 367). It is to the EU’s international profile that the article now turns. 
 
 
International Developments and EU Activity in Multilateral Climate Change Policy-
Making 
 
As a result of the internal developments noted in the previous section, the EU has 
established itself as a prominent environmental actor at the national and regional level. 
However, it also had to establish an external legal competence for it to become a 
prominent international actor in this policy area. By doing so, it could move forward to 
engage more actively in international environmental politics. 
 
The EU’s legal competence in international environmental politics is known as shared 
(or mixed) competence.10 Legal competence is important as it determines which 
institutions have the authority to act internationally on behalf of the EU. The EU’s 
system of shared competence determines who will represent the Union at international 
negotiations, sign and ratify agreements reached at the negotiations, and implement 
domestic measures necessary to meet commitments under such agreements.11 In 
theory, the Commission speaks for the EU when areas under the Union’s exclusive 
competence are being discussed and the Member State holding the Presidency speaks 
                                                 
9 It is noteworthy that while Turkey is not a member of the EU, it is a member of the EEA. 
10 This differs greatly from areas traditionally guided by exclusive competence, like trade policy. For 
useful discussions of shared competence, see Delreux (2006), Vogler (1999) and Macrory and Hession 
(1996). While the 1957 Treaty of Rome gave express external competences to the European Economic 
Communities in only two policy areas (trade and association agreements with third states), today, 
under the Treaty of Nice, the EU’s express external competence includes financial and monetary 
policy, external trade policy, research policy, environmental policy, development cooperation and 
association agreements (Delreux 2006: 234). 
11 For discussions of the practicalities of EU representation in negotiations and signing, see Delreux 
(2006) and Macrory and Hession (1996). For recent work on implementation and enforcement, see 
Hovi et al. (2007). 
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for the EU when areas of shared competence are being considered. Despite this legal 
distinction, the Commission can be asked to represent the EU when areas of mixed 
competence are being discussed (Sbragia 1998a: 293: 295). The Commission may also 
be involved in negotiations more informally: “No matter who negotiates on behalf of 
the EU, intensive coordination between the different European actors during 
international environmental negotiations and conferences is part of the day-to-day 
practice. These on the spot coordination meetings take place at the location of the 
international negotiations, mostly every morning and every evening during the 
international negotiations” (Delreux 2006: 244). 
 
While the system of shared competence has become standard operating procedure 
within the EU, it can create the potential for confusion at international negotiations 
(Sbragia 1998a: 294; Macrory and Hession 1996: 113). For example, multilateral 
environmental negotiations often take years, but the Union’s Presidency lasts only six 
months, which can produce a puzzling series of interlocutors.12 Likewise, because 
environmental negotiations often touch upon other policy areas, the institution legally 
charged with representing the Union can change back and forth.13 Under such 
conditions, third parties may wonder with whom they are actually negotiating, 
especially if different EU representatives and institutions speak across time on the 
different policy areas being discussed. This potential for confusion can also weaken the 
EU’s credibility in the minds of some third party negotiators when it comes to 
implementation and enforcement commitments. 
 
But how did the EU get to this complex institutional arrangement for external 
representation? The answer is that “The path towards external recognition has often 
been a struggle” (Delreux 2006: 233); the internal developments mentioned above 
played a role, but international developments were also necessary to complete the 
Union’s transformation. The success of the EU’s transformation is reflected in the fact 
that it has signed over sixty multilateral environmental agreements.14 But to do so, it 
has had to acquire recognition from third-party negotiators and negotiating forums. 
 
The United Nations (UN) is the primary forum in which international climate change 
negotiations occur. Representation in international negotiations often requires 
membership in the associated organisation or at least recognition by negotiating 
partners (Jupille and Caporaso 1998). The EU’s first strides in acquiring third-party 
recognition occurred with the passing of a 1974 UN General Assembly Resolution that 
granted the EU only permanent observer status, including participation rights, in the 
General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council.15 While the resolution 
recognised the EU’s rights to participate in these important UN institutions, it did not 
address a role for the Union in multilateral environmental negotiations that might take 
place outside of those institutions. 
 
In 1979, the EU was granted the status of Regional Economic Integration Organisation 
(REIO), which allowed the Union to participate in multilateral environmental 
negotiations.16 As a REIO, the EU can be party to a convention even if none of its 
                                                 
12 See European Commission (2001: 27). In contrast, scholars have also argued that the EU’s variable 
representation is no longer a significant obstacle for third party negotiators (Vogler 1999). 
13 Negotiations over environmental policy can touch upon industrial policy, consumer policy, overseas 
economic development policy, science and research policy, agricultural policy, marine/fisheries policy, 
technology policy, fiscal policy, energy policy, transport policy and humanitarian assistance policy. 
14 According to some measures, the EU is signatory to hundreds of multilateral environmental 
agreements, including multiple renewals of pre-existing ones. 
15 UNGA Resolution 3208 (XXIX), 11 October 1974. According to this arrangement, the EC (represented 
by the European Commission) and not the EU, formally possesses permanent observer status. 
16 At the domestic level, Sbragia (1998a: 289) points out that “The link between the Community and 
other international bodies was explicitly recognized by the European Council held in Stuttgart in June 
1983. The Council stated it saw the necessity to take coordinated and effective initiatives both within 
the Community and internationally, particularly within the ECE, in combating pollution (Johnson and 
Corcelle 1995: 22)”. 
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Member States are party to the convention. Where REIO status does not apply, 
participation rights have been negotiated on a case-by-case basis; EU participation, 
therefore, still has to be negotiated and approved on an ad hoc basis for different 
multilateral environmental negotiations. Specifically in climate change negotiations, 
Article 22 of the Climate Change Convention “provides for ratification of the 
Convention by states and ‘Regional Economic Integration Organizations’” (Macrory and 
Hession 1996: 112).17 This legal measure ultimately allowed the EU to sign onto and 
ratify the Kyoto Protocol in May 2002, making it the only regional organisation to do so. 
 
Following from the UN’s 1974 resolution and its REIO status, the EU also maintains 
active institutional relations (as an observer) within the UN system of governance via 
two of its key bodies for dealing with environmental issues: the UN Environment 
Programme and the Commission on Sustainable Development. Although it does not 
possess full participatory rights, the EU is a major financial donor and has become a 
prominent advocate of numerous proposals to re-organise global environmental 
governance (Damro 2006; Vogler 2005; European Commission 2004). 
 
The EU’s ability to engage in multilateral environmental negotiations is also apparent in 
its ability to attain objectives and to manage lengthy UN negotiations on climate 
change. For example, one need only investigate the UNFCCC’s Kyoto Process (1992-
present). These long negotiations were pushed forward by the EU despite the 
withdrawal of the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter—the United States of 
America. The prominence of the EU’s role certainly fluctuated during this process 
(Grubb and Yamin 2001). Nevertheless, the EU seems to have demonstrated the ability 
to act as a prominent player by encouraging enough countries to ratify the Protocol for 
it to come into force in February 2005. The EU also may have learned the skill of issue 
linkage when it seemed to convince Russia to ratify the Protocol in exchange for the 
Union’s support of Russia’s WTO membership bid (Damro 2006). 
 
Much of the EU’s success in the UNFCCC’s Kyoto Process is due to the ability of its 
Member States to understand and operate within its complex institutional framework 
and system of shared competence. At the same time, the EU’s decisions and behaviour 
are also clearly influenced by international factors and the need for recognition by third 
parties. These institutional arrangements and pressures from the national and 
international levels can create feedback that results in new institutional developments 
at the regional European level, as will be highlighted in the next section. 
 
 
The EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
 
Given the various institutional factors affecting the EU’s role in climate change policy at 
different levels, it seems sensible to explore an empirical case in which the Union has 
played a prominent role. The establishment of the EU’s internal Emissions Trading 
Scheme (ETS) demonstrates how the Union can operate as an authoritative regional 
point of interaction between the national and international levels. At the national level, 
the ETS has become a ‘flagship’ for EU climate change policy (Delbeke 2006: 7) and now 
covers roughly half of the EU’s CO2 emissions. At the international level, it represents a 
case in which the EU changed its position and now seems to be engaging as a 
prominent player. Despite these positive outcomes, the EU’s creation of the world’s 
largest and most comprehensive (European Commission 2006: 1) emissions trading 
scheme faced high set-up costs. Add to this the international uncertainty surrounding 
                                                 
17 In accordance with the Decision of the Council OJ L33 07/2/94 p11 Conclusion of the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, “The Community acceded to the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change with the Members States and has therefore arrived at a full participatory role in the 
future developments of the Convention, including the Conferences of Parties” (Macrory and Hession 
1996: 112). 
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the Kyoto Protocol at the time the EU began working on its ETS, and the Union’s 
decision to move forward with the initiative seems particularly puzzling and risky. 
 
The decision to create a new market for carbon trading reveals the complicated 
causality that can occur across different levels when the EU engages in climate change 
policy. Many factors from the national, regional (EU) and international levels certainly 
had an impact on the decision to move forward with emissions trading. A number of 
studies have problematised and tried to disentangle these multiple causes. While this is 
not the place to provide a comprehensive review of the relevant literature, it is worth 
noting briefly a few studies for their efforts to disentangle these multiple causes. 
 
First, studies have explored the EU’s motivations for adopting the idea of emissions 
trading after initially resisting it in the international negotiations. Damro and Luaces-
Mendez (2003) argue that the EU adopted the idea of emissions trading as part of a 
process of policy learning that drew from US experiences with similar domestic 
schemes.18 Cass (2005) argues that the EU’s advocacy for emissions trading is best 
understood as the result of shifting ‘frames’ of debate that allowed the Union to 
overcome norms that had previously prevented its support for such a market-based 
mechanism. Second, other studies have focused their analyses on the reasons why the 
EU issued its 2003 directive establishing the ETS. Wettestad (2005) tends to emphasise 
the central role played by the European Commission while Oberthür and Tänzler (2007) 
and Oberthür (2006) tend to emphasise the causal role of international regimes. The 
sum total of these scholarly efforts suggests that explanations of emissions trading and 
the ETS need to consider a significant causal role for domestic and international 
factors.19 Likewise, future analyses of multiple factors will be necessary to explain the 
impact that the EU’s ETS will (or will not) have on global efforts to create an 
international emissions trading system. 
 
Keeping with the analytical theme of this article, it is worth trying to identify important 
institutional and other pressures from different levels that might help to explain the rise 
and operation of the ETS. At its most basic level, the EU’s ETS arose from the UNFCCC 
process and the resulting Kyoto commitments. Early in the negotiations, the EU resisted 
the market-based instrument of emissions trading in favour of more command-and-
control regulatory and taxation schemes.20 By contrast, the USA was the primary driver 
of the new instrument, based on its previous experience with similar domestic trading 
systems.21 These differing positions were a point of contention from the outset of the 
negotiations. As Sbragia points out, as early as “1992 EU Finance Ministers insisted that 
any EU carbon tax be implemented only on condition that the USA and Japan acted in 
kind. Japan agreed on condition that the USA enact some kind of carbon tax. The 
Clinton administration refused” (1998a: 299). Despite this early stalemate, the EU’s 
gradual adoption of the idea of emissions trading allowed for compromise and created 
an opportunity for progress in the negotiations. 
 
But what could have triggered the EU’s change of position? Some of the change can 
certainly be attributed to an international process of policy learning. For example, one 
Brussels policy-maker noted direct policy learning on this issue through transatlantic 
visits by Commission officials to observe US trading schemes in action.22 This claim is 
supported by the Commission’s statement that “The ETS’s ‘cap and trade’ system was 
inspired by a United States model introduced in the 1990s to curb acid rain” (European 
                                                 
18 For a study that emphasises ‘ossification’ as the opposite of policy learning within the context of 
climate change, see Depledge (2006). 
19 For an analysis of climate change politics that challenges the necessity of investigating domestic 
politics, see Grundig (2006). 
20 An early Commission predilection for carbon taxes is apparent in the fact that Carlo Ripa de Meana, 
the then-Environment Commissioner, refused to go to the 1992 Rio Summit because of the lack of 
commitment to carbon taxes by the Council of Ministers (Sbragia with Damro 1999: 61). 
21 Oberthür and Tänzler (2007: 264), Christiansen and Wettestad (2003), Damro and Mendez (2003). 
22 Expert Interview, Copenhagen, Denmark, 14 March 2007. 
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Commission 2006: 2). Domestic politics and institutional obstacles also played a role. In 
the early 1990s, the Commission realised that it would face a difficult, if not impossible, 
battle with its Member States over a carbon and/or energy tax. Crucially, both fiscal 
instruments and energy policy require unanimity (as opposed to qualified majority) in 
the Council of Ministers. Since the Commission would be unlikely to convince all 
Member States in the Council to agree to an EU carbon/energy tax, the proposal faded 
(Braun 2008).23 The combination, therefore, of international policy learning and the 
domestic politics and institutional constraints of taxation highlight the pressures 
coming from different levels. Indeed, as one Brussels insider noted of the cross-level 
pressures, “So, we saw that the tax was failing on the one hand and we saw that 
emissions trading was pushed by the United States, so the two were coinciding and so 
we changed approach”.24 
 
As the EU was gradually changing its position, the US was gradually reducing its 
commitment to the Kyoto Process—for example, President Clinton decided not to send 
the Protocol to a Senate that publicly opposed ratification, and President Bush 
effectively withdrew from the process in March 2001. As a result, the EU became the 
most prominent advocate for emissions trading within the Kyoto framework (Schreurs 
and Tiberghien 2007: 20; Wettestad 2005: 17). Cass adds that “Once the United States 
became disassociated with the trading proposals, the European Union was able to 
enter the void with greater credibility with the European public and environmental 
NGOs and play a more innovative role in the development of the trading mechanism” 
(Wettestad 2005: 40). 
 
As this international role and commitment evolved, the EU then began to push for the 
creation of its own domestic, Europe-wide ETS—a costly new policy initiative that 
would create an entire new market as a potential complement to any future 
international emissions trading scheme. Despite the costs, the EU moved forward very 
rapidly with the establishment of this new policy instrument. As Oberthür and Tänzler 
(2007: 266) note, “the discussions on setting up an EU-wide system of GHG emissions 
trading advanced at a high speed after the European Commission first declared in 1998 
that ‘the Community could set up its own internal trading scheme by 2005’”.25 
 
The speed with which the EU created its ETS is particularly noteworthy because the 
Union lacked previous experience with such a market-based mechanism (Wettestad 
2005). The fundamentals, however, of emissions trading are rather straight-forward. The 
European Commission (2006: 1) itself provides a concise description of how the ETS is 
intended to operate: 
 
…large emitters of greenhouse gases receive an annual allotment from their national 
governments specifying the amount of CO2 they may release into the atmosphere each year. 
Emitters may sell any ‘surplus’ allowances or credits to EU-based companies that need help to 
meet their targets. Emitters exceeding their allowances may also choose to invest in ways to 
reduce their emissions. By providing a financial incentive to curb CO2 emissions—essentially 
putting a price on carbon emissions—the ETS is helping to change the mindset of European 
business. 
 
                                                 
23 According to one insider, the UK offered strong resistance to the tax and was supported to varying 
degrees at different times by Spain, Ireland, Germany and Greece (Expert Interview, Copenhagen, 
Denmark, 14 March 2007). 
24 Expert Interview, Copenhagen, Denmark, 13 March 2007. 
25 Oberthür and Tänzler (2007: 266) also identify the following rapid timeline for important 
institutional developments related to the ETS: “In October 2001, the Commission presented a 
proposal for an EC Directive on an EU-wide emissions trading scheme (European Commission 2001a: 
581). EU environment ministers agreed on the rules for the EU-wide trading scheme in December 
2002 (European Council 2002) and the resulting EU directive entered into force in October 2003 
(European Council 2003a). The EU started a pilot phase of the scheme in 2005, which is to be followed 
by a full-blown system that will become operational in 2008 (from the beginning of the 2008-12 Kyoto 
Protocol commitment period)”. 
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As the Commission began organising its regional ETS, it also had to contend with 
budding national emissions trading schemes in Member States such as the UK and 
Denmark. Without proper coordination, these national schemes could develop into 
instruments that were incompatible with the EU-level ETS. Such national schemes 
could also create advantages for certain Member States. As Zito (2005: 371) argues, 
“The Netherlands and the UK have been seeking to develop their ideas on this system 
in order to gain some first mover advantage and ‘upload’ their ideas within the larger 
EU debate and prevent disruption to their domestic systems (Jordan et al. 2005)”. The 
UK national scheme provides a useful example regarding the potential for 
incompatibility. In particular, the British began developing a voluntary scheme, while 
the EU supported a mandatory scheme. This incompatibility helped to encourage the 
rapid development of the EU’s ETS. As one Brussels insider notes 
 
We wanted to signal very early on that we were developing our own scheme and that our 
scheme was different in its approach. And to be frank, in 2001, when we made the proposal, 
the UK was already keen on emissions trading. They had, however, their own vision of how 
trading would work. It was a voluntary approach, driven by financial incentives, in which 
electricity generators would not be covered directly, but users of electricity would be made 
responsible for the emissions arising from electricity generation. The UK had difficulty in 
persuading other Member States of the merits of their scheme, particularly in terms of its 
complexity. It took a good twelve months of negotiation for the UK to reconsider its position. 
The Commission was anxious to ensure a complete dovetailing and compatibility with the 
Kyoto Protocol, which basically made the country where emissions occurred accountable, 
irrespective of where electricity might be consumed. And the UK’s ‘indirect’ emissions 
approach was different.26 
 
While the creation and operation of the ETS is often cited by the Commission as a 
success (European Commission 2006), its record has been somewhat mixed thus far. 
The ETS began operating in a pilot Phase I on 1 January 2005. The Member State 
governments granted emissions permits (allowances) for three years until 2007 to 
factories and power stations, mainly for free. On 15 May 2006, the carbon market 
crashed: while the market to trade CO2 had almost doubled in a year, more than two-
thirds of it vanished in three weeks after the May crash. The price of a permit to release 
a tonne of carbon dioxide plunged 72% to €8.60 in three weeks after a series of 
Member State and Commission reports showed that a surplus had accumulated. This 
crash reveals a potential implementation problem for the EU, which could undermine 
its credibility and prospects for prominence at the national and international levels. The 
future of the EU carbon market is, however, relatively bright. It is now clear that the 
initial allocations made during the pilot phase were over-estimated, which resulted in 
allowances of many more CO2 permits than were needed. This problem should be 
remedied now that emissions have been audited more accurately. As a result, national 
allocations should be more realistic, which will reduce (but not eliminate) the likelihood 
of future crashes. 
 
With more accurate allocations reducing the likelihood of another crash, the most 
important issue for the ETS may be the way in which National Allocation Plans (NAPs) 
are formulated and approved. These NAPs were recently submitted to the ETS second 
phase process.27 During the initial preparation of the ETS, a formal division of labour 
was established in which the Commission took responsibility for creating the market 
mechanism and the Member States took responsibility for the allocations.28 This 
arrangement still allows for a considerable role of the Commission—Member States 
formulate their individual NAPs, which are then sent to Brussels for the Commission to 
evaluate and suggest changes before final approval. The Commission uses two criteria 
for evaluating the NAPs: 1) compatibility with the EU’s internal burden-sharing 
agreement and Kyoto commitments, and 2) national need. The NAPs, however, remain 
a contentious issue among the Union’s environmental “leaders and laggards” 
                                                 
26 Expert Interview, Copenhagen, Denmark 14 March 2007. 
27 For more on the NAPs process, see http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/pdf/m06_452_en.pdf. 
28 Expert Interview, Denmark, Copenhagen, 14 March 2007. 
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(Lenschow 2005: 313-314), and many Member States disagree with the Commission 
decisions. Indeed, on 1 August 2007, Latvia became the sixth Member State to contest 
emissions levels and take the Commission to court over specific calculations.29 
 
 
Conclusions: Obstacles and Opportunities at Different Levels 
 
At first glance, the EU’s unique nature might seem to create insurmountable obstacles 
for any significant role in future climate change policy. It is true that the EU does face a 
number of domestic obstacles—due to the complex institutional arrangements that 
pool sovereignty among twenty-seven Member States—that are not faced by 
individual states and international organisations. In addition, the ad hoc nature of its 
participation from one international negotiation to the next may be somewhat 
problematic and its system of shared legal competence can be confusing for third 
parties. 
 
Despite these obstacles, the EU’s position as an authoritative regional point of national 
and international interaction also provides it with significant opportunities to influence 
climate change policy at multiple levels. Indeed, it seems to have established itself as a 
prominent actor in national, regional and international climate change policy-making. 
Through a number of historical-legal institutional developments, it has overcome 
obstacles to domestic and international activity in environmental politics. The domestic 
obstacles have been overcome to a large extent by ECJ decisions, Commission 
initiatives (like EAPs), new institutions (such as DG Environment and the EEA) and 
important Treaty changes. Overall, the EU’s institutions now seem to operate fairly 
smoothly according to its own internal procedures and routine monitoring 
mechanisms. Many international obstacles to its activity have also largely been 
overcome. It is now recognised by third-party negotiators and very active in global 
environmental governance. It has received UN recognition, participates in UN 
negotiations, and has demonstrated an ability to be effective in lengthy UN 
negotiations. 
 
The EU still faces multiple pressures from different levels that will influence its future 
role in climate change policy-making. Further studies that investigate both levels will 
need to take into consideration the various political actors—including individual 
Member States, regional organisations, international organisations, and non-state 
actors (e.g., NGOs, political parties, firms, environmentalists, labour, consumers, 
scientific communities)—and the legal and institutional constraints under which they 
make decisions. 
 
In the future, much of the EU’s domestic and international prominence in this policy 
area may hinge on the operation of its ETS. At the domestic level, the EU needs to 
resolve disagreements over the process through which NAPs are decided. But if the 
EU’s internal market for emissions trading enjoys success, it may encourage more 
innovative solutions to address climate change. Most importantly, in the long-term, this 
market could also create sufficient incentives to deliver the promised domestic 
emissions reductions. At the international level, the successful implementation of a 
fully-functioning ETS should create a first-mover advantage in this lucrative financial 
service and increase the EU’s credibility as a prominent player in the ongoing climate 
change negotiations. These multiple factors could, therefore, continue to push the EU 
toward a sustained prominent role in climate change policy. 
 
The year 2012 is fast becoming a crucial juncture by which time a much clearer picture 
should be available regarding the EU’s role and effectiveness in domestic and 
international climate change politics. At the domestic level, the EU’s 6th EAP expires in 
2012. The 7th EAP will have to take into consideration a number of important climate 
                                                 
29 The other Member States include Poland, Czech, Slovakia, Hungary, Estonia. See Mahony (2007). 
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change developments and growing pressures from different levels that have emerged 
over the last ten years. The Kyoto Protocol also expires in 2012, a deadline that is 
currently driving international negotiations over what type of system will follow. 
Developing countries may also start reducing greenhouse gas emissions in 2012—this 
is particularly important because non-participation by developing countries is currently 
one of the US’s greatest problems with the Kyoto Protocol. Of course, by 2012, the US 
will have elected a new Administration that could decide to return fully to the 
negotiating table and challenge EU prominence. This convergence of multiple events 
suggests that the ongoing European and international negotiations are extremely 
important for determining the shape of climate change policies to come. We need only 
watch carefully for the answers as 2012 approaches. 
 
 
*** 
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